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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
are two cases in which the widow's claim is not superior.
Where the decedent had executed a mortgage, the mort-
gagee has priority over the claim of the widow," and the
costs of the administration also take priority to the right of
the widow.4 5 The reason assigned in the last case is that
such expenses are incurred in the ascertainment of the
amount of the estate without which, the estate has not legal
existence.4" It is submitted, however, that since the pur-
pose of the exemption is to furnish subsistence until the
estate has been ascertained, the exemption should take
precedence to the costs of the administration of the estate.
W. ROBERT THOMPSON.
CREATION AND TAXATION OF JOINT BANK DE-
POSITS-The first situation to be considered is the case
in which a deposit is made in a bank by one person in the
names of two others. If these two persons are not hus-
band and wife the deposit will create a joint-tenancy. At
common law the right of survivorship was an incident of a
joint-tenancy. But this right of survivorship has been
abolished by the Act of March 31, 1812, 5 Sm. L. 395.1 Thus,
a mere deposit in the names of two persons not husband
and wife would by virtue of the Act of 1812 create a joint-
tenancy without the right of suvivorship. Therefore, up-
on the death of one of the persons in whose name the de-
posit is made, the decedent's interest in the fund would not
vest in the survivor by operation of the right of survivor-
ship, and could, consequently, be subjected to an inheritance
tax. But if in the creation of the joint -tenancy it has been
provided 2 that the right of survivorship shall apply, then
upon the death of one of the joint-tenants, the survivor is
deemed to be the sole owner by virtue of the right of sur-
vivorship s and a tax levied upon the decedent's interest in
the fund is improper. The reason for this is that the Act
44Kauffman's Appeal, supra; Allentown's Appeal, supra; Nerpel's
Appeal, 91 Pa. 334 (1879).
45McIntyre's Estate, 44 C. C. (Pa.) 111 (1915)'.
'8 Weir's Estate, supra.
'Mardis, Admrx. v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 16.
2Arnold v. Jack's Admr., 24 Pa. 57 (right of survivorship given by
direction of testator) ; Redemptorist's Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa.
24; Kerr v. Verner, 66 Pa. 326; Jones v. Cable, 114 Pa. 586; Lentz
v. Lentz, 2 Phila. 148 (by implication of words in will).
8 Mardis, Admrx. v. Steen, supra,
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of 1812 has been interpreted to mean merely that the fact
that a joint-tenancy has been created does not, as a matter
of law, give the survivor the entire ownership of the pro-
perty. In other words the Act of 1812 simply abolishes the
legal presumption that the right of survivorship attaches
when a joint tenancy is created, and the creator of the ten-
ancy may still provide for the same right of survivorship
as applied before the statute.
4
It might be well to note in passing that the context of
the Act of 1812 seems to apply merely to joint-tenancies
in real property and does not seem to have any application
to joint-tenancies in personal property. The statute speaks
only of real property and yet it has been extended to cover
joint-tenancies in personal property for apparently no other
reason then to make uniform the laws as to real and per-
sonal property. 5
The cases dealt with thus far have been those in which
one party makes a deposit in the names of two others, or
conveys or devises lands, or conveys or bequeaths per-
sonal property to two others. In such cases it has been
shown that if the donees or devisees are not husband and
wife a joint-tenancy is created. But suppose a man makes
a deposit in the joint names of himself and another instead
of the joint names of two other persons. The fund on de-
posit is subject to the check of the donor, and therefore he
has not really relinquished control over it. Prior to the
case of Mardis, Admrx. v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, it was held
that because the donor had not relinquished control over
the fund he never parted with title, and hence there was no
delivery of the subject of the alleged gift.8 In a case de-
cided in 1914T it was held, "the gift must be completed by
actual or constructive delivery beyond the power of revoca-
tion". If the donor retained a right of revocation, as by
the power to draw on the fund, then the gift was not com-
plete and no joint-tenancy arose.8 Notwithstanding these
holdings the Supreme Court decided that the fact that the
funds were at all times subject to the check of either party
4Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 549. That the rule applies to real
and personal property, see cases cited in Note 2.
5Yard's Appeal, 86 Pa. 125.
6Fianagan v. Nash, 185 Pa. 41; Terpoak v. Terpoak, 85 Pa. Su-
per. 470.
7Turner's Estate, 244 Pa. 568.
8Flanagan v, Nash, Supra.; Waltman v, G. T, Co. 92 Pa. Super.
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did not make the transaction subject to the objection that
the gift was not complete. Therefore, even though the
fund is subject to the check of the donor, and he thereby
has a right of revocation, the gift is a complete one and a
joint-tenancy arises. Then, if the intention of the donor is
that the joint deposit should be a joint-tenancy with the
right of survivorship it will be so held.0
Upon the death of one of the joint-tenants a tax such
as the one authorized by the Transfer Inheritance Tax Act
of June 20, 1919, P. L. 521, as amended by the Act of May 4,
1921, P. L. 341, could not be imposed upon the interest of
the decedent.10 The survivor of the joint-tenants becomes
the owner of the property by virtue of the stipulation made
by the donor at the time of the making of the deposit and
not because of the transfer at the death of the decedent.
For this reason the Transfer Inheritance Tax, supra, which
taxes "transfers of property - - - by deed - - - made or in-
tended to take effect in possession or in enjoyment at or
after such death" is not effective.
The next situation which arises is the case of a deposit
in the names of a husband and a wife. Where husband and
wife hold property jointly they hold by the entireties.'
The estate by entireties may exist in personalty as well as
in realty, in choses in action as well as in choses in pos-
session.1" The tenancy established by a conveyance to a
husband and wife is not destroyed or affected by the Act
of 1812, which abolished survivorship in joint-tenancies."s
Thus the right of survivorship is incident to an estate held
by entireties.
The first case to be discussed is the one in which a
third party makes a deposit in the names of husband and
wife. It is not necessary that the husband and wife be
described as such in the instrument creating the tenancy
in order that a tenancy by entireties may arise. Whether
or not it does arise depends solely on the relation of the par-
9Mardis, Admrx. v. Steen, Supra.
"0 McIntosh's Estate, 289 Pa. 509; Leach's Estate, Supra.
"Donnelly's Estate, 7 Pa. C. C. 177; Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. 401;
Gillon v. Dixon, 65 Pa. 395; Slaymaker v. The Bank, 10 Pa. 373;
Klenke's Estate, 210 Pa. 572.
12Klenke's Estate, supra; Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628; Parry's
Estate, 188 Pa. 33.
IsBramberry's Estate, supra; (nor is it affected by the Married
Women's Property Act of 1893).
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ties."4 It is plain, then, that in the case of a deposit by a
stranger in the names of a husband and a wife, the tenancy
created is one by entireties with the right of survivofship
attached even without an express stipulation to that effect,
and upon the death of one the interest of the decedent in
the fund cannot be taxed by a taxing statute such as was
previously mentioned.15
Again, as in the case of joint-tenancies, there is a div-
ersity of opinion in cases in which the donor makes a de-
posit in the joint names of himself and another. Does a
tenancy by the entireties arise where a husband, out of his
own funds, makes a deposit in the joint names of his wife
and himself? In Parry's Estate, 6 Dist. 717, the court held
that no tenancy arose because the gift was incomplete. The
husband still had the right to draw upon the account, which
in this cdse was a letter of credit, and therefore since he did
not relinquish control over the fund the gift was incomplete
and no tenancy arose. Upon trial in the Supreme Court,
however, the decision of the lower court was reversed.'6
The Supreme Court held that an estate by entireties was
created. The reasoning employed was that although it was
not an absolute gift to the wife of the whole amount, it
was an estate in personalty, the value of which to her de-
pended on two contingencies, 1. Survivorship, 2. Balance re-
maining at the death of her husband. Both contingencies
having happened the gift is executed.
There are cases which do not use the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in the Parry case, but simply say that the
gift is a complete one and that therefore an estate by the
entireties is created.17 An estate by the entireties created
in this manner would likewise not be subject to the taxing
statute. 8
Moreover, it has been held, that a federal taxing sta-
tute which attempts to tax the "transfer of a net estate of
a decedent to the extent of the interest therein held as
tenants in the entirety by a decedent and any other per-
son"' 9 etc., is unconstitutional because in an estate by en-
tireties the husband and wife are each deemed to hold the
14Raible's Estate, 10 D. & C. 747.
15Transfer Inheritance Tax of 1919, as amended in 1921.
16Parry's Estate 188 Pa. 33.
l7Griffith's Estate, I Lack. L. N. 311; Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa.
346; Roka v. Trust Co., 10 D. & C. 94.
"8See Note 15.
19Estate Tax Act of 1916, Sept. 8, C, 463 (39 Statute 777),
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entire title, and that no new estate is conferred on the sur-
vivor on the death of the spouse. Therefore the tax is a
direct tax upon property, requiring apportionment accord-
ing to the U. S. Constitution, 20 and is not a tax upon the
transfer of property" which according to the Constitution
requires merely that it be subject to geographical uniform-
ity g.
Morton Klaus
LIABILITY OF AN INFANT PARTNER TO FIRM
CREDITORS-The contracts of an infant, with few ex-
ceptions, are not void, but merely voidable. An infant has
a general contractual capacity quite the same as an adult,
but protection is extended by affording him a personal op-
portunity to avoid obligations which otherwise would be
binding.'
An infant may become a partner, and, as in other con-
tracts, the partnership agreement is voidable at the option
of the infant.2 However, the infant's liability is rendered
somewhat peculiar and is not the same as in ordinary con-
tracts,
By weight of authority, an infant who has contributed
property to the firm upon becoming a member, may not
withdraw his contribution so as to jeopardize firm credi-
tors; although he may exempt himself from personal liab-
ility by repudiating his contract.' and he thereby frees his
individual estate from attack. A few Pennsylvania cases
have more or less directly passed upon this rule.
Although Dulty v. Brownfield4 is hardly on point, it
was deemed advisable to note it as there is a dearth if
20Art. 1, sec. 2, Subsec, 3.
21Tyler v. United States, 28 Fed. 2nd 887,
22Art. 1, Sec. 8, Subsec. 1, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41;
Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993. That the same rule should apply
to joint-tenancies, see McIntosh's Estate, Supra.
L31 C. J. see. 149; Gilmore on Part. 79.
231 C. J. sec. 193; Burdick on Part. (2nd Ed.) 94.
831 C. J. sec. 193Y ; 16 A. & E. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.) 287;
Crane and Magruder's Cases on Part. 97; Gilmore on Part. 82; Jen-
nings v. Stannus, 191 Fed. 347, 112 C. C. A. 91; Bush v, Iinthicum, 59
Md. 344; Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 A. 644; Dana v. Stearns, 3
Cush. (Mass.) 372; Whitemore v. Elliott, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 5J8; Lovell v.
Beauchamp, A. C. (Eng.) 607; Burdick's Cases on Part. 155.
41 Pa. 497.
